הספריה המשפטית
נטלים וחזקות - דין ומהות

הפרקים שבספר:

מבוא

כפי שנראה בחיבור זה בהרחבה, המונח "נטל ההוכחה" משמש לעיתים בשני מובנים שונים: האחד, נטל השכנוע, השני, נטל הבאת הראיות.

נטל השכנוע הוא הנטל העיקרי ובדרך-כלל הוא קבוע ועומד ואינו עובר במהלך המשפט מבעל דין אחד למשנהו. נטל הבאת הראיות הוא הנטל המשני ועשוי להתחלף במהלך המשפט.

במשפט הפלילי - "נטל השכנוע" או "חובת השכנוע", מבטאים את החובה להוכיח בראיות קיומה של עובדה ברמת הוודאות המוטלת על-פי הדין על הצד הנושא בחובה זו. עובדה בהקשר זה משמעה הן עובדה פיזית והן הלך-נפש. "חובת הראיה" היא החובה המוטלת על בעל דין להביא את ראיותיו. הנושא ב"חובת השכנוע" נושא ראשון ב"חובת הראיה".

במשפט האזרחי - "נטל השכנוע" מבטא את החובה העיקרית המוטלת על בעל דין {תובע או נתבע} להוכיח את טענותיו כלפי יריבו, כאשר אי-עמידה בה משמעה דחיית הטענות. "חובת הראיה" טפלה לחובה העיקרית ומשמעה היא החובה להביא ראיות לעמידה באותו נטל.

כפי שנראה, המשפט האזרחי {בניגוד למשפט הפלילי} הווריאציות לגבי החלת חובת ההוכחה בכלל הינן מגוונות וזאת בשל המצבים העובדתיים המגוונים והרבים במסגרת המשפט האזרחי.

על-כן, מעבר לעקרונות-העל המשפטיים החלים בהקשר לחובת ההוכחה, קיימת חשיבות בבחינת מקרים עובדתיים שונים ובסוגיות משפטיות שונות מן המשפט האזרחי.

המושג הרחב שקנה לו אחיזה בספרות המשפטית ובפסיקת בתי-המשפט כמושג-על בשאלת דרכי ההוכחה במשפט בכלל, הינו המושג של "נטל ההוכחה" או "חובת ההוכחה".

כך למדים אנו, כדברי פרופ' א' הרנון, בספרו {דיני ראיות, חלק ראשון, 189} לפיהם "המונח "נטל ההוכחה" (BURDEN OF PROOF OR ONUS OF PROOF) משמש, לעיתים בשני מובנים שונים: נטל השכנוע ונטל הבאת הראיות... נטל השכנוע הוא הנטל העיקרי ובדרך-כלל הוא קבוע ועומד ואינו עובר במהלך המשפט מבעל דין אחד למשנהו. נטל הבאת הראיות הוא הנטל המשני ועשוי להתחלף במהלך המשפט. ובקיצור לשון: נטל השכנוע - עניינו מהימנות הראיות, נטל הבאת הראיות אין עניינו אלא דיות הראיות".

כב' השופט ש' אגרנט ב- ע"פ 28/49 {זרקא נ' היועץ המשפטי, פ"ד ד(1), 504 (1950)} מסביר את מהותם של שני נטלי ההוכחה ומצביע על אפשרות שאכן העיקרון לפיו נטל השכנוע הינו קבוע לעולם, אינו עיקרון מוחלט וכי קיימות נסיבות בהן אף נטל השכנוע יעבור לצד האחר {הנתבע או האשם}. ובמה דברים אמורים.

אשר לחלוקת חובות ההוכחה - כידוע, שתיים הן החובות הללו: נטל השכנוע ("חובה מס' 1"} ונטל הבאת הוכחות/ראיות {"חובה מס' 2"}.

הקביעה בדבר חלותה של החובה האחת או האחרת על בעל דין בעניין הקונקרטי מתייחסת לשאלה העובדתית, השנויה במחלוקת.

אשר לנטל השכנוע {"החובה מס' 1"} - פירושו, כי בעל הדין, שנושא בו, חייב להוכיח את העובדה השנויה במחלוקת ואשר הוכחתה מהווה תנאי לזכייתו במשפט, כך שאם לא ישכיל להוכיחה, תיפול ההכרעה בגינה לרעתו.

כך למשל, במשפט רשלנות רגיל, חייב התובע להוכיח את היסודות המרכיבים את עילת תביעתו, קרי, כי הנתבע חב לו חובת זהירות; שהוא הפר אותה ושעקב ההפרה הזאת נגרם לתובע נזק.

כיוצא בזה, אם הגיש התובע תביעה לפי שטר חוב שעליו חתם הנתבע, חייב זה להוכיח את טענת הפטור {כגון פרעון השטר}, בה הוא מתגונן כלפיה.

כיוון שיש לפנות אל המשפט המהותי, על-מנת להיווכח, מה הם היסודות המרכיבים את עילת התביעה ומה העובדה או העובדות המקנות לנתבע הגנה כלפיה, הרי שהמשפט המהותי הוא, בעיקר, הקובע בשאלה, על מי מהצדדים חל נטל השכנוע, הגם שבבוא בית-המשפט להחליט בה, הוא ייעזר גם בכתבי הטענות, מהם עולות השאלות העובדתיות, שהן במחלוקת.

נוכח אפיו המהותי, בעיקרו של דבר, של הכלל הנדון היה פעם מוסכם, כי הצד הנושא בנטל השכנוע בתחילת המשפט הוא הנושא בו לעולם גם בסופו, כלומר, חובת הראיה {מס' 1} אינה "מתחלפת" לעולם, היינו, היא מוטלת מהתחלת המשפט ועד סופו על הצד הטוען את הטענה הנדונה.

ואולם, מצאנו כי העיקרון המורה על "יציבותו" של נטל השכנוע אינו בעל אופי אוניברסלי ושיש לסייגו. כלומר, אומנם בדרך רגילה לא יעבור נטל השכנוע, במשך המשפט, מצד לצד והוא יישאר מונח, עד הסוף, על שכמו של מי שנושא בו בתחילה ואולם, יכול שבמהלך הדיון, תקום, בנוגע לעובדה שיש עליה מחלוקת, חזקה מן הדין, הפועלת לטובת הצד שנשא קודם לכן בנטל השכנוע לגביה, ואשר כוחה הוא להעביר את הנטל ליריבו.

אין צריך לומר, שחשיבותה המיוחדת של קביעת נטל השכנוע היא בכך שאם בסוף המשפט העריך השופט שההוכחות של הצדדים הן שקולות ומאוזנות, כי אז יכריע את הדין לרעת הצד הנושא בנטל השכנוע.

לסיכום, הכלל של ה"חובה מס' 1", אשר המימרה "המוציא מחברו - עליו הראיה", באה לבטאו.

אשר לנטל הבאת הוכחות/ראיות {חובה מס' 2} - כדי לפשט את ביאור החובה הזאת, נצא להלן מתוך ההנחה, כי מדובר במקרה בו מוטלת על התובע, בתחילת המשפט, החובה מס' 1, כלומר החובה להוכיח את קיומם של יסודות תביעתו.

חובה כאמור גוררת - וזה מטבע הדברים - שהתובע הוא גם החייב לפתוח בהוכחותיו ופירוש הדבר, שעליו להביא עדות המספקת להוכיח את תביעתו הוכחה לכאורה. כזהו נטל הבאת ההוכחות {חובה מס' 2} מבחינתו של התובע, וברור שאם לא השכיל להרימו, די בכך, כדי שייצא מפסיד במשפט.

אם כן, השלב הבא הוא: אם הצליח התובע במשימה האמורה, כי אז עוברת החובה מס' 2 לנתבע.

ואולם, מבחינתו של האחרון, חשוב להבחין בין שני האספקטים של אותה חובה, וזאת בשים-לב לטיבה של ההוכחה הלכאורית, שהביא התובע.

בנקודה זו, נעיר כי בהיעדר עדות מצד הנתבע, יהיה השופט רשאי, אך לא חייב, לפסוק את הדין לטובת התובע. למשל, השופט לא יהיה אז חייב לעשות כן, אם לאחר ששקל את העדות שהביא התובע, הוא מוצא, שאין להאמין לה, או שאין להסיק ממנה, אפילו אם היא מהימנה עליו, את המסקנה העובדתית, אשר לתובע עניין בה; ואם כך תהיה הערכתו, אזי ברור שפסק-דינו יהיה לטובת הנתבע.

על-כן, אם ההוכחה הלכאורית של התובע כל משמעותה היא, שאם לא יביא הנתבע הוכחות, יהיה השופט רשאי, אך לא חייב, לתת פסק-דין נגד האחרון, כי אז יוצא, כי החובה מס' 2 "שעברה" לנתבע בתום פרשת הראיות של התובע, אין בה יותר "מאשר סיכון" שראיות התובע, אם יהיו נאמנות על השופט, עלולות לשמש יסוד לפסק-דין נגד הנתבע.

אין בכך יותר מאשר סיכון בשביל הנתבע, הואיל וייתכן, שנוכח טיבה של ההוכחה הלכאורית כאמור, הוא בכל זאת יזכה בדין, גם אם לא יביא ראיות מצידו.

מנקודת ראות זו, ניתן לומר, שהחובה מס' 2 איננה נטל אמיתי של הבאת הוכחות, אלא רק - כפי שאחרים רגילים לכנותה - "חובה טקטית".

המשמעות האחרת, אשר יכול שתהיה להוכחה הלכאורית של התובע היא, כאשר ההוכחה הזאת יש לה משקל כה חזק עד שברור כי, בהיעדר עדות מצד הנתבע, לא תהא לשופט ברירה, הגיונית, אלא לפסוק את הדין לטובת התובע. בלשון קרוס {בספרו על הראיות (מהדורה שמינית), 22}:

..." Where a party's evidence in support of an issue is so weighty that no reasonable man could help deciding the issue in his favour in the absence of further evidence."

אם ההוכחה הלכאורית של התובע היא בעלת משקל שכזה, אזי עובר לנתבע נטל הבאת הוכחות ממש ופירוש הדבר, שעליו להביא עדות אשר די בה להחדיר ספק לליבו של השופט וביתר דיוק לחייב את הערכתו, לאחר שקלו את ראיות הצדדים, אלה כנגד אלה, אם לא ימלא הנתבע את הדרישה הזאת, כי אז ברור שהשופט יפסוק נגדו.

לעומת זה, אם הוא יעמוד בה, תהא הכרעת השופט לטובתו, וזאת בשים-לב לכך, כי בסוף המשפט נושא עדיין התובע - זה הכלל הרגיל - בנטל השכנוע.

בהסבירו את סוגיית נטל ההוכחה, הפיצול לשני הסוגים של נטל ההוכחה, ואי-הבהירות העולה לעיתים בין שני סוגי הנטלים, כותב קרוס בספרו {על הראיות (מהדורה שמינית), 119}:

"Burdens and proof
'When an issue of fact has to be proved in a court of law it is first necessary to consider the burdens borne by the parties. The allocation of burden helps to determine which party should begin calling evidence, a procedural matter to be discussed further in ch VI, and by extension how to decide upon a submission that there is no case to answer.
The nature of a burden in the law of evidence is obscured by the use of the term in a number of different senses which are distinguished and discussed in the first section of this chapter. The two principal senses are the burden of adducing evidence and the burden of proving facts. In relation to both, questions arise as to the incidence of the burden, and the discharge of the burden. The second section considers the allocation of the burden in these two senses, at common law and under statutory provisions, and how it is affected by presumptions of the law or by agreement of the parties. The third section of the chapter, dealing with the discharge of the two burdens, is principally concerned with the extent of those burdens, and with the way in which the burden of proof has to be explained to the jury.
The key to clarity in this whole area lies in the precise definition and discrimination of the issues to be tried, and of the facts upon the determination of which they depend. Unfortunately this is hindered by the absence of formal pleadings or developed pre-trial proceedings in criminal cases, and more generally by the lack of an agreed terminology. These factors have contributed to some confusion in the authorities, for example on such issues of whether burdens of proof can shift, and as to the precise effect of presumptions.
SECTION 1. NATURE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, the American scholar Thayer claimed that the phrase 'burden of proof' is used in more than one sense. It is necessary to discuss only two of the three senses he mentioned because the third was said to be 'an in discriminated use of the phrase, perhaps more common than either of the other two, in which it may mean either or both of the others.'
Thayer's first sense of the term was:
The peculiar duty of him who has the risk of any given proposition on which parties are at issue - who will lose the case if he does not make this proposition out, when all has been said and done.
This nearly corresponds to the persuasive burden, or burden of proof in the strict sense, which is discussed below. The correspondence is not complete because no allowance is made in the passage quoted for the fact that the burden in question is confined to particular issues. Most cases involve more than once issue, and the burden of proof upon the different issues may be variously distributed between the parties - a fact which can be readily appreciated by considering a claim in contract in which the terms of the agreement are in dispute and infancy is pleaded as a defence, a claim for damages for negligence in which the defendant raises the issue of contributory negligence, or a criminal charge on which insanity is pleaded. Owing to the possible multiplicity of issues, a party may have 'the risk' of a given proposition and yet not lose the case if he fails to make the proposition out; an example would be a claim in contract in which the defendant pleads both infancy and duress; the defendant bears the burden of proof on each of these issues, but failure on one of them does not entail the loss of the case.
Thayer's second sense of the phrase 'burden of proof' was:
The duty of going forward in argument or in producing evidence, whether at the beginning of a case, or at any later moment throughout the trial or discussion.
This corresponds in part to the evidential burden discussed below, but it is a much broader concept because, in addition to embracing argument as well as the adduction of evidence, it covers not merely the obligation placed on a party by the law to be able to point to the existence of sufficient evidence to raise an issue before the tribunal of fact, but also the tactical obligation to lead counter-evidence placed upon a party against whom evidence has been adduced. To anticipate, Thayer's second sense of the term 'burden of proof' conflates the evidential burden with what is sometimes called a 'provisional' or 'tactical' burden.
Just because Thayer failed to distinguish between the strict senses of the legal and evidential burden as described below, and the burdens which arise as between different issues, or as a matter of tactics in the course of a trial, his successors, both in extra-judicial writings, and in judicial opinions, have had to refine his terminology. These refinements have not been uniform, and have contributed substantially to the confusion over the question of whether burdens can shift, exacerbated by parallel problems over the role and terminology of presumptions. This section will first consider burdens in the strict sense, the other candidates for that terminology will then be considered in connection with the whole question of the shifting of burdens in the third part of this section. "

קרוס, בספרו {שם, בעמ' 121} ובהמשך דבריו, גם מגדיר את סוגי הנטלים, באמרו:

"A. THE TWO PRINCIPAL SENSES OF BURDEN
.1 PERSUASIVE BURDEN
The persuasive burden is the obligation of a party to meet the requirement that a fact in issue be proved (or disproved) either by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond reasonable doubt as the case may be. The words in brackets are intended to cover the case in which a party has to negative a particular fact as the prosecutrix has to negative consent on a charge of rape. The words are also apt to cover a case in which a party has to negative a particular fact if his opponent adduces sufficient evidence of its existence. An example would be provided by a murder trial at which self-defence is pleaded; if there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of a reasonable jury, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in selfdefence.
Wigmore spoke of the 'risk of non-persuasion'. Williams subsequently sharpened this to the 'persuasive burden' by way of contrast to the 'the evidential burden'. This terminology is clear, and it is submitted, clearly preferable to such alternatives as the 'legal burden' employed by Lord Denning and is justified by the fact that its incidence is determined by the substantive law. Other English writers refer to it as 'the burden of proof on the pleadings'; or 'the fixed burden of proof. Both burdens are 'legal' in the sense that they operate as a matter of legal rule; the pleadings do not always indicate which party bears the burden, and the 'evidential burden' also has claims to be described as 'fixed'. Nor is it satisfactory that some recent judgments in which the distinction between the principal burdens is mentioned simply refer to this one as the 'burden of proof or the 'probative burden', even though such a course may be justified by the fact that the discharge of the other principal burden, the evidential burden, proves nothing.
In a civil case where at the end of the day the evidence upon an issue is found to be too evenly balanced to determine the matter one way or the othe then the issue must be determined by the incidence of the persuasive burden, as the House of Lords has recognised :
No judge likes to decide cases on burden of proof if he can legitimately avoid having to do so. There are cases, however, on which owing to the unsatisfactory state of the evidence, or otherwise, deciding on the burden of proof is the only just cause for him to take.
In criminal cases also it can happen that where the evidence is equivocal between two coaccused, each of whom alleges that the crime was committed by the other, then both must be acquitted, even though it is abundantly clear that the crime must have been committed by one or the other of them.
2. EVIDENTIAL BURDEN
The evidential burden is the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, due regard being had to the standard of proof demanded of the party under such obligation. The concluding clause is designed to meet the point that the amount of evidence required to induce a judge to leave an issue to the jury varies according to whether the case is civil or criminal, and whether the party bearing the burden is plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or accused.
The phrase 'evidential burden' is employed by Bridge and Williams (while Phipson spoke with equal accuracy of the 'burden of adducing evidence' a phrase which is coming to be increasingly used by the English judges. Wigmore described it as the duty 'of passing the judge', and there is no doubt that the difference between the two principal burdens is best approached by considering the position of a plaintiff or prosecutor with regard to such issues which are about to be tried with a jury as defamation, or the doing of a criminal act by the accused. He has two hurdles to surmount. First, he must produce a sufficient quantity of evidence to prevent the judge from withdrawing the issue from the jury, and secondly he must convince that body. If he surmounts the first, he may yet fail at the second. This may be because the jury do not believe his witnesses, or will not draw the necessary inferences, or else because of the doubt raised by the counter-evidence. To quote Wigmore:
The important practical distinction between these two senses of 'burden of proof' is this: the risk of non-persuasion operates when the case has come into the hands of the jury, while the duty of producing evidence implies a liability to a ruling by the judge disposing of the issue without leaving the issue open to the jury's deliberations.
Two further points must be stressed in connection with the definition of the evidential burden. In the first place, it caters for the abnormal situation where the party who starts with the persuasive burden of proof does not also bear the evidential burden, as well as for the normal situation where they are each borne by the same person in the first instance. To vary an illustration which has already been given with reference to selfdefence, on a prosecution for murder, for example, the Crown has the persuasive burden of negativing provocation, but questions of provocation do not have to be considered by the jury unless there is evidence on the subject, and it is up to the accused to produce this evidence, although he has to raise only a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether his conduct was provoked or unprovoked.
Secondly, it must not be supposed that the production of evidence always involves the giving of testimony. This will be necessary in the vast majority of cases in which an evidential burden has to be discharged, but there are rare instances in which the evidence called on the other side is sufficiently equivocal to have this effect. On a prosecution for murder, the Crown witnesses might say enough in-chief about the provocation to make the judge feel obliged to raise the question in his summing up, although the matter will usually be brought before the court in consequence of the cross-examination of the Crown witnesses, reinforced by the accused's evidence-in-chief. It is also possible that evidence may be sufficient to raise a defence which the accused does not wish to advance. In such a case it should not be left to the jury. "

קרוס {שם, בעמ' 123}, מבהיר גם את אי-הבהירות והמבוכה, בקשר עם שני הנטלים וכדבריו:

.3" Illustrations of Confusion
Two major sources of confusion in this part of the law are: first, failure to agree upon, the discrimination of separate issues to which the rules are to apply; and second, failure to distinguish explicitly between the legal and evidential burden. One example will be given of each.
In DPP v. Morgan the accused were charged with rape. Their defence wa that the victim consented, or at least that they believed her to be consenting The trial judge directed the jury that it was for the prosecution to show that the act took place and to negative consent, but, in effect, that it was then for the accused to adduce some evidence to show that his belief in the victim's consent was reasonable. This view was upheld by the Court of Appeal where Bridge J distinguished between cases where the definition of the offence specified a particular mental state in which case the prosecution bore both legal and evidential burdens of showing it, and cases where there was no such definition in which case the issue of reasonable belief arose as a separate issue, the evidential burden of establishing which was on the accused. The House of Lords accepted Bridge J's analysis, but allowed the appeal because, by a majority, it took the view that in rape there was only one issue as to the accused's mental state, and as to that the prosecution bore both burdens. The whole difficulty arose simply because it was uncertain whether in relation to the accused's mens rea there was one issue, or two.
In Woolmington v. DPP the accused was charged with murdering his wife from whom he was separated, and he gave evidence to the effect that he had shot and killed her accidentally while endeavouring to induce her to return to live with him by threatening to shoot himself. Swift J's summing up to the jury contained the following passage:
If the Crown satisfy you that this woman died at the prisoner's hands, then he has to show that there are circumstances to be found in the evidence which has been given from the witness box in this case which alleviate the crime, so that it is only manslaughter, or which excuse the homicide altogether by showing that it was a pure accident.
Woolmington was convicted, but his appeal was allowed when it reached the House of Lords because the jury had been misdirected.
The actual decision turned on the point that Swift J's direction suggested that, the killing having been admitted, the persuasive burden of disproving malice aforethought shifted to the accused, but Lord Sankey's speech in the House of Lords also shows that, even in cases in which the defence consists of something other than a denial of an essential element of the prosecution's case, a plea of provocation or selfdefence for instance, the accused does not, as was formerly believed, bear a legal as well as an evidential burden. The speech can be regarded either as marking a change in the law or as an insistence on the distinction, ignored by the old authorities, between the persuasive and evidential burdens. Whichever be the correct view, there is no doubt that a number of appeals have been decided on the point that the judge wrongly instructed the jury that the accused bore the burden of proof on a particular issue whereas all that was borne by him was an evidential burden, a matter with which the jury has no concern. "

בהגדירו, מובנים נוספים של העברת הנטל וסוגי נטלים אחרים כותב קרוס {שם, בעמ' 125}:

"B. OTHER SENSES AND SHIFTING OF BURDEN
The definitions of the two principal senses of burden adopted above in this book render it difficult to speak meaningfully of the shifting of either of them. The evidential burden has been defined as the obligation to show, if called upon to do so, that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue. The persuasive, 'legal', or 'probative' burden has been defined as the obligation of a party to meet the requirement of a rule of law that a fact in issue must be proved or disproved. The question whether there is sufficient evidence to raise the issue of the existence of a particular fact can be answered only after both parties have called their evidence and, when there is a jury, the answer must be given by them after the)' have been instructed by the judge. Writing with reference to a criminal trial with a jury Williams has said:
The evidential burden governs what the judge does in leaving the question to the jury or withdrawing it from them, the persuasive burden governs what he says in directing the jury how to reach their verdict.
The concept of the evidential burden is the product of trial by jury and the possibility of withdrawing an issue from that body. Unlike the concept of the persuasive burden it is not a logical necessity of litigation about questions of fact; 'If it were to be said of any issue, that it was not covered by an evidential burden, the only effect would be to remove the judge's filtering power in respect of that issue'. It is accordingly difficult not to sympathise with Browne-Wilkinson V-C who preferred the expression not to be used in civil proceedings since it was so apt to be applied to the provisional burden as defined and described below.
It is true that, when dissenting in DPP v. Morgan, Lord Simon of Glaisdale spoke of the shifting of the evidential burden 'backwards and forwards in the course of a trial', but he was attempting to justify the view of the Court of Appeal that, as a matter of law, someone charged with rape bears the evidential burden on the issue of his mistaken belief that the woman was consenting to intercourse. The decision turned on the substantive law, but, so far as the evidential burden was concerned, the majority of the House of Lords appears to have accepted the argument of counsel for the appellant summarised as follows by Lord Cross of Chelsea:
If [the Crown] adduces evidence to show that intercourse took place and that the woman did not consent to it then in the absence of any evidence from the defendant the jury will certainly draw the inference that he was aware that she was not consenting. So as a practical matter he is bound - if he wishes to raise the point - to give evidence to the effect that he believed that she was consenting and as to his reason for that belief; and the weaker those reasons are the more likely the jury is to conclude that he had no such belief. But the issue as to the accused's belief in the woman's consent is before the jury from the beginning, and is an issue in respect of which the evidential burden is on the Crown from the first to last. There is never any question of any evidential burden with regard to it being on the accused or of the judge withdrawing it from the jury.
It remains to be seen what judges, and others, really have in mind when they refer to the shifting of a burden. Three possibilities are worthy of consideration. The first is that the concept of a burden has been attenuated to refer only to the provisional or tactical desirability of adducing evidence in order to avoid an adverse decision of the issue by the trier of fact. The second is that the concept of a burden has been expanded to apply outside the confines of a single issue, and to refer instead to the fluctuation of fortunes in a multiple issue case, considering the cumulative effect of the sequential resolution of each successive issue. The third uses burden in the sense so far discussed, but directs attention to cases where the allocation of one of the burdens is made conditional upon the proof of some other fact. The first two of these are considered in turn here, and the third in the next section in relation to the allocation of the burden of proof.
.1 THE PROVISIONAL BURDEN
A provisional burden is one which is borne by the opponent of an issue after the proponent has discharged his evidential burden. The opponent must, in the words of Lord Denning, 'call evidence or take the consequences which may not necessarily be fatal'. An example is provided by any criminal case in which the prosecution relies on the actus reus as evidence of mens rea. By not calling evidence on the subject the accused runs the risk of an adverse finding with regard to his mental state if the jury accepts the Crown's version of his external conduct. The degree of risk run by an opponent who does not adduce evidence on a particular issue varies from case to case. In civil proceedings the proponent's evidence may be so weighty that a verdict or decision in his favour will be demanded by common sense and ajudge would be justified in directing a jury or himself accordingly. In criminal cases tried with a jury the situation is complicated by the rule that there cannot be a directed verdict of guilty, but judges sometimes allude to a shifting of the burden of proof on account of the strength of the evidence adduced by the accused on issues as to which he bears the evidential and persuasive burdens.
Lord Denning even speaks of the provisional burden shifting to and fro in the course of a case.19 No doubt judges often have something of this sort in mind when they refer to a shifting of the burden of proof, but the concept of a provisional burden (sometimes called a 'tactical burden') is devoid of legal significance because there is no means of telling when it has been brought into existence or when it has been discharged. It is evidential in the sense that it entails the calling of evidence but, by definition, it is non-existent at the beginning of a case when judicial ruling with regard to burdens may be obtained. Such a ruling may likewise be obtained at the end of a proponent's case if the judge is required to decide whether enough evidence to raise a particular issue has been adduced, but, in the first instance at any rate, a provisional burden is borne by the opponent. There can be no further ruling on burdens until the end of the case when the persuasive burden is the all important matter.
If a fact in issue may be inferred from the proof of another particular fact in a commonly recurring situation, the language of presumption is often employed. The fact which is proved can be referred to as the basic fact, and the fact inferred as the presumed fact. Thus Lord Denning refers to such a presumption as casting a provisional burden upon the opponent of the presumed fact. In other words the party proving the basic fact is likely to win on the issue to which the presumed fact relates in the absence of evidence to the contrary adduced by the other. According to older classifications, presumptions having this limited effect are described as 'presumptions of fact', such as the presumption of continuance, the presumption of guilty knowledge arising from the possession of recently stolen goods and the presumption of unseaworthiness in the case of a vessel which founders shortly after leaving port. These are all inferences which may be drawn by the tribunal of fact. It is not obliged to draw them as a matter of law even if there is no further evidence, although there may be occasions on which a civil jury should be directed that they ought to draw the inference as reasonable men, and, in civil cases verdict, or even the decision of a judge sitting alone, might be set aside if the inference was not drawn.
A further example is the presumption of intention in its modern form. DPP v. Smith? ([1961] AC 290, [1960] 3 All ER 161) decided that, in certain circumstances, there was a conclusive presumption that normal people intend the natural consequences of their acts, and it is possible to point to many statements made before Woolmington v. DPP ([1935] AC 462) to the effect that the presumption applies until the contrary is proved. But s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 provides that:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence -
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions;
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
What used to be a presumption of law in criminal cases has thus become a presumption of fact. In the words of Lord Sankey in Woolmington's case: '[I]f it is proved that the conscious act of the prisoner killed a man and nothing else appears in the case, there is evidence upon which the jury may not must find him guilty of murder.' Although there are many statements in civil proceedings suggesting that the presumption of intention is one of law, it is best regarded as one of fact. As in the case of the presumption of seaworthiness, the tribunal of fact may be virtually obliged to find in favour of the presumption when there is nothing to suggest a contrary conclusion.
.2 THE ULTIMATE BURDEN
The 'ultimate burden' as used by Lord Denning is a phrase appropriate only to a case involving more than one issue, but it is often used by other judges as a synonym for the legal or persuasive burden. To quote Lord Denning:
Where the ultimate decision of a case depends on the determination of a number of separate issues, the burden on the ultimate issue needs to be distinguished from the burden on the separate issues.
The ultimate burden is thus the burden borne by the party against whom the persuasive burden on a particular issue has been discharged. Lord Denning illustrates his meaning by reference to an action brought by the holder against the acceptor of a bill of exchange. The ultimate decision depends on whether the plaintiff is a holder in due course. He might begin by proving that he was the holder of a bill signed by the defendant as acceptor. He will succeed on his claim unless the defendant makes good some such defence as fraud in the negotiation of the bill. In his turn the defendant will succeed unless the plaintiff makes good a reply such as value in good faith subsequent to the fraud: 'this shifting to and fro is often described as shifting of the burden of proof and so it is, but it is a shifting of the ultimate burden'. No doubt such progression towards Lord Denning's ultimate burden (sometimes spoken of as 'the burden of proof on the whole case' or the 'general burden of proof) is what judges sometimes have in mind when they say that burdens have 'shifted', but the concept is subject to the same objections as those which have been advanced against the provisional burden, and to the further objection that, in the context of the law of evidence, the expression 'burden of proof is meaningless unless it is used with reference to a particular issue. The interaction of persuasive, evidential, provisional and ultimate burdens was conveniently illustrated in Ratford v. Northavon District Council. The authority levied a rate upon the receivers of a company occupying rateable property in their area. It was held that, provided there was some reasonable basis for supposing a person to be in occupation of such property, the authority was entitled to levy a rate upon them. In proceedings for non-payment the authority bore both evidential and legal burdens of showing that the rate had been duly made, demanded and not paid. The non-payer would then lose unless he satisfied the evidential and persuasive burden upon the next issue, that of showing a valid reason why he had not paid. In this case the receivers adduced evidence showing that, although empowered to do so, they had not in fact taken possession of the relevant premises. Once this had been done, and the evidential burden upon that issue satisfied, the only sense in which a burden could further shift was in the provisional sense, but its ultimate determination would decide the whole case. On this point the court endorsed the remarks of Donaldson L. J in Forsythe v. Rawlinson that it was like all burdens of proof in litigation a swinging burden in the sense that:
As the evidence of varying weight develops before the magistrates, the eventual burden of proof will, in accordance with ordinary principles of evidence, remain with or shift to the person who will fail without further evidence."

מקורמיק, בספרו {על הראיות (מהדורה רביעית), 568} מסביר את נטל ההוכחה כדלקמן:

"THE BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
336&. The Burdens of Proof: The Bur-den of Producing Evidence and the Bur-den of Persuasion
"Proof" is an ambiguous word. We some-times use it to mean evidence, such as testi-mony or documents. Sometimes, when we say a thing is "proved" we mean that we are convinced by the data submitted that the al-leged fact is true. Thus, "proof is the end result of conviction or persuasion produced by the evidence. Naturally, the term burden" of proof shares this ambivalence. The term encompasses two separate burdens of proof. One burden is that of producing evidence, satisfactory to the judge, of a particular fact in issue. The second is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true.
The burden of producing evidence on an issue means the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue has not been produced. It is usually cast first upon the party who has pleaded the existence of the fact, but as we shall see, the burden may shift to the adver-sary when the pleader has discharged its initial duty. The burden of producing evidence is a critical mechanism in a jury trial, as it empowers the judge to decide the case with-out jury consideration when a party fails to sustain the burden.
The burden of persuasion becomes a crucial factor only if the parties have sustained their burdens of producing evidence and only when all of the evidence has been introduced. It does not shift from party to party during the course of the trial simply because it need not be allocated until it is time for a decision. When the time for a decision comes, the jury, if there is one, must be instructed how to decide the issue if their minds are left in doubt. The jury must be told that if the party having the burden of persuasion has failed to satisfy that burden, the issue is to be decided against that party. If there is no jury and the judge is in doubt, the issue must be decided against the party having the burden of persuasion.
What is the significance of the burden of persuasion? Clearly, the principal signifi-cance of the burden of persuasion is limited to those cases in which the trier of fact is actually in doubt. Possibly, even in those cases, juries disregard their instructions on this question and judges, trying cases without ju-ries, pay only lip service to it, trusting that the appellate courts will not disturb their findings of fact. Yet, even if an empirical study were conclusively to demonstrate both a regular disregard for jury instructions and a propensity on the part of judges to decide issues of fact without regard to their express statements concerning the allocation of the burden of persuasion, rules allocating and describing that burden could not be discarded by a rational legal system. A risk of nonpersuasion naturally exists any time one person attempts to persuade another to act or not to act. If the other does not change her course of action or nonaction, the person desiring change has, of course, failed. If no burden of persuasion were acknowledged by the law, one possible result would be that the trier of fact would purport to reach no decision at all. The impact of nondecision would then fall by its own weight upon the party, usually the plaintiff, who sought a change in the status quo. Although this is generally where the law would place the burden anyhow, impor-tant policy considerations may dictate that the risk should fall on the opposing party.
Another possibility would be that the trier of fact would itself assign a burden of persuasion, describing that burden as it saw fit by substituting its own notions of policy for those now made available to it as a matter of law. Such a result would be most undesirable. Considerations of policy that are sufficient to suggest that in some instances the burden of persuasion be assigned to the party desiring a maintenance of the status quo are strong enough to dictate the need for a consistent rather than a case by case determination of the question. Other policy considerations, such as those that have led the law to require that the prosecution in a criminal case prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, are sufficient to require that the jury be explicitly and clearly instructed as to the measure of the burden as well as its allocation. Although judges and juries may act contrary to the law despite the best attempts to persuade them to do otherwise, we can at least give them the benefit of thoughtful guidance on the questions of who should bear the burden of persuasion and what the nature of that burden should be. In jury trials, perhaps the problem has not been in the concept of a burden of persuasion, but rather in the con-fusing jury instructions that abound on this point of law. In nonjury trials, if judges are not in fact following rules of law allocating the burden, the fault may lie not in the concept but with thoughtless judicial and legislative allocations and descriptions of the burden."